The (generalized) Gini indices rely on the social welfare function of a decision maker who behaves in accordance with Yaari's model, with a function f that transforms frequencies. This SWF can also be represented as the weighted sum of the welfare of all the possible coalitions in the society, where the welfare of a coalition is defined as the income of the worst-off member of that coalition. We provide a set of axioms (Ak) and prove that the three following statements are equivalent: (i) the decision maker respects (Ak), (ii) f is a polynomial of degree k, (iii) the weight of all coalitions with more than k members is equal to zero. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: D63
As pointed out by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1994) , these non-additive functionals admit a "canonical representation", that has a nice interpretation in the context of social choice. Let the society be described as the set of all the possible coalitions in that society. Define the utility level of a coalition as the utility level of its worst-off member. Then, the Choquet integral may be written as a linear combination of these coalitional utility levels.
But, actually, the Gini index and its generalizations are related to a rather particular case of Choquet integrals: the non-additive measures used here are symmetric. Which means that one can write the Choquet integral in a rather simple way, using a frequency distortion function. This paper focuses on the link between the canonical representation of a Choquet integral with respect to a symmetric non-additive measure, the distortion function and the Gini index that relies on this Choquet integral.
More specifically, we prove a result suggested by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1995) , namely that the weight of all coalitions with more than k members is equal to zero if and only if the distortion function is a polynomial of degree (at most) k. Now, assume that a decision maker behaves in accordance with Yaari's dual model (so the inequality index that rely on this decision maker's preference is a generalized Gini index). We provide a set of axioms (Ak) that generalize an axiom proposed by Ben Porath and , such that the decision maker respects axiom (Ak) if and only if his frequency distortion function is a polynomial of degree (at most) k. We call P -Gini the generalized Gini indices with a polynomial distortion function. These indices have a very natural interpretation in terms of the weight the decision maker puts on envy in the society. These results may provide a normative benchmark for the choice of a specific generalized Gini index among the wide class of all the generalized Ginis.
Canonical Representation, symmetric capacities and Polynomial Distortion Functions
Let Ω = {1, ..., n}, with n ∈ N * (so, n is not fixed), Σ = 2 Ω and Σ = Σ \ {∅}. We consider the space of random variables G = {g |g : Ω → R }. A capacity is a function v : Σ → R, with v (∅) = 0. We consider here capacities that are monotone (i.e.,
for all A, B ∈ Σ) and normalized (i.e., v (Σ) = 1). The Choquet integral of g ∈ G with respect to v is defined as:
This integral can be written as (see e.g. Gilboa and Schmeidler (1994) ):
where such that v (T ) = f (P (T )), where P is a probability measure over (Ω, Σ). Therefore, α v T only depends on |T | and f . Hence, if |T | = j we will note α v T as α f j . Furthermore, in that case, we have
where
. In other words, with a symmetric capacity, the Choquet integral reduces to Yaari's dual model (1987) ).
A straightforward computation shows that
A direct application of the binomial formula leads to:
Hence, we have
This relation between the weights α f j and the j th finite difference of f is the key of our results.
We can now state the following result.
Theorem 1 For a Choquet integral with respect to a symmetric capacity, the two following propositions are equivalent:
Proof. See the Appendix.
Note that (i) ⇒ (ii) had been proved in a much more general framework by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1995) , in the proof of their Theorem C (they don't require for Ω to be countable).
Measuring Inequalities without Linearity in Envy
We denote by Γ the set of rank-ordered discrete and uniform income distributions, with values in R. An income distribution X in Γ is defined by: X = x 1 , 1 n ; ...; x n , 1 n where n belongs to N * , x i belongs to R for all i, x i ≤ x i+1 for all i in {1, ..., n − 1}.
Let
be the decision maker's preference relation over Γ (as usual, we will denote 
The generalized Gini index that relies on this welfare function can then be written as:
whereX denotes the mean of X. 
Consider the following set of axioms:
for all i, j, and ε such that T k i (ε) and T k j (ε) are well defined and X +T k i (ε) and X +T k j (ε) ∈ Γ.
These axioms may be understood as follows. First, one can interpret T k i (ε) as a taxation scheme. With this interpretation, T 1 i (ε) consists in making individual i pay ε (without any transfer): one obtains X + T 1 i (ε) (let X ∈ Γ, so x i ≤ x i+1 ). Admittedly, a decision maker will consider that such a policy has a negative impact on welfare. The next question we can ask is: Does the size of this negative impact depend on the location where this policy is applied, i.e., the rank of the individual who has to pay ε? If not, the decision maker respects (A1). But this implies that the decision maker is not concerned at all by equality: making the poorest one or the richest one paying ε is, from his point of view, equivalent. Now, assume that the decision maker thinks -which seems reasonable if he cares about inequality -that it is better to apply this policy to individual i rather than to individual (i − 1). We then have
which for ε small enough (i.e., such that x i−1 + ε ≤ x i − ε) implies, by the independence axiom:
In other words, it implies that the decision maker considers the policy T 2 i (ε) (which is known as a Pigou-Dalton transfer) as a welfare improving one. He is inequality averse in the very standard sense: any Pigou-Dalton transfer increases his measure of welfare. But then, we can go further and ask whether the size of the increase of welfare implied by this policy depends on the location in the income distribution where this policy is applied. If the answer is no, the decision maker respects axiom (A2). Assume, on the other hand, that the location where this policy is applied is relevant. In particular, if the decision maker is quite sensitive to inequalities, it may be the case that the lower this policy is applied, the better it is -from the decision maker's point of view -(this is the "rank dependent" version of the principle of diminishing transfer: see e.g. Mehran (1976) , Kakwani (1980) , Chateauneuf and Wilthien (1999) , Zoli (1999) ). In this case we have (x 1 , ..., x i−2 + ε, x i−1 − ε, x i , x i+1 , ..., x n ) (x 1 , ..., x i−2 , x i−1 + ε, x i − ε, x i+1 , ..., x n ) which implies for ε small enough:
that is X + T 3 i (ε) X. Therefore, the decision maker believes that the policy T 3 i (ε) has a negative impact on welfare. Does the size of this impact depend on the location where this policy is applied? If not, the decision maker respects axiom (A3). If it does, then one can think that the lower this policy is applied, the higher is the cost in terms of welfare. Which in turn implies that the decision maker consider the policy T 4 i (ε) as a favorable one, and so on.
Some remarks may be in order. First, note that A (k − 1) implies Ak. Second, for any k ∈ N, axiom (Ak) is equivalent to the following one:
for all i, j, and ε such that T k i (ε) and T k j (ε) are well defined and
Indeed, it is obvious that (Ak * ) implies (Ak) (simply let X = Y in (Ak * )). Assume that (Ak) is satisfied. Then, for any X and Y in Γ and i, j, ε such that (ii) the decision maker respects axiom (Ak).
Proof. See the Appendix. Now, we define the P −Gini indices as follows: a generalized Gini index IG is a P −Gini index if f is a polynomial. Theorems 1 and 2 imply readily the following corollary. 
If f is a polynomial with degree (at most) k, ∆ j f i n = 0 for any j = k + 1, k + 2, ..., and i = j, ..., n. So, in particular, ∆ j f j n = 0 for any j = k + 1, k + 2,..., n. Therefore,
Assume that for any j > k, α f j = 0. This implies that for any j > k, ∆ j f j n = 0. But we have, for fixed k, and for any i ≥ 0, l = 0, ..., n:
So, in particular: ∆ k+1 f j n = 0, ∀j, n ∈ N such that k < j ≤ n which in turn entails that f is a polynomial of degree (at most) equal to k by the lemma (obviously, the degree of f is exactly k if α f k = 0).
Proof of Theorem 2
(i) ⇒ (ii)
